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1 Introduction
This note addresses the Word Trade Organization (WTO) dispute
United States  Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect
To Certain Softwood Lumber From Canada (WT/DS257); denoted
‘‘Softwood Lumber IV ’’ below. The issues discussed by the Panel and the
Appellate Body (AB) in this dispute are very closely related to those
examined by the Panel in United States  Preliminary Countervailing
Duty Determination With Respect To Certain Softwood Lumber From
Canada (WT/DS236); to be referred to as ‘‘Softwood Lumber III.’’ This
dispute was not appealed, and the AB thus did not have the opportunity
to provide its view on the issues raised in the dispute. The fundamental
character of several of the issues at stake in both these disputes
makes the AB’s determination in Softwood Lumber IV particularly
interesting.
The Panel in Softwood Lumber IV  ‘‘the Panel’’ if not stated
otherwise  saw itself as facing seven claims by Canada:
(1) The United States Department of Commerce (USDOC) erred in
determining that ‘‘stumpage’’ is a financial contribution in the form
of the provision of a good by provincial governments.
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(2) The USDOC erred in finding that the Canadian provincial stumpage
programs confer a benefit.
(3) Even if stumpage does provide subsidies, the USDOC erred in not
conducting a pass-through analysis in determining subsidization
of softwood lumber in the case of certain upstream transactions for
inputs.
(4) The USDOC failed to determine that the programs are specific
subsidies within the meaning of Art. 2 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).
(5) The USDOC inflated the subsidy amount by using an inaccurate
factor to convert the US log measurements into cubic meters.
(6) The United States did not comply with its obligations under
Art. 12 SCM in regard to two aspects of the investi-
gation, which concerned the change in the choice of benchmark
state from the preliminary to the final determination, and the use
of information based on a letter of the Maine Forest Products
Council.
(7) The Byrd Amendment payments distorted the assessed support
for the investigation, in violation of Art. 11.4 SCM.
The Panel found the following:
(1) The USDOC’s determination that provision of stumpage consti-
tutes a financial contribution in the form of the provision
of a good or service was not inconsistent with Art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii)
SCM.
(2) The USDOC’s determination of the existence and amount of benefit
to the producers of the subject merchandise was inconsistent with
Art. 14 and 14(d) SCM.
(3) The USDOC’s failure to conduct a pass-through analysis in respect
of upstream transactions for log and lumber inputs between
unrelated entities was inconsistent with Art. 10 SCM and Art. VI:3
of GATT 1994.
(4) The USDOC’s determination that the provincial stumpage
programs are specific was not inconsistent with Art. 2.1(c) SCM.
The Panel refrained from adjudicating on claims (5) and (6) for
reasons of judicial economy, and Canada essentially withdrew
claim (7).
Both Canada and the United States appealed certain findings by the
Panel, giving the AB the opportunity to address claims (1)(3) above.
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In this note, we will examine the AB’s determination in regard to
issues (2) and (3), concentrating on what we see as new elements
in relation to Softwood Lumber III; we discussed the latter dispute in
Horn and Mavroidis (2005). We will, however, refrain from discussing
issue (1)  whether stumpage programs provide goods in the sense
of the SCM  even though it may have broken some new legal
ground. We simply find the issues addressed in this context to be of
such a legal/technical nature that they lack more general interest.
Let us just note that for reasons explained in Horn and Mavroidis
(2005), we find it clear that from the point of view of the object and
purpose of the SCM (if not the text and context), the stumpage
programs must be seen as ‘‘providing goods,’’ and that they may thereby
confer a benefit. We thus fully agree with the AB determination in
this regard:
. . . we uphold the Panel’s finding, in paragraph 7.30 of the Panel Report,
that USDOC’s ‘‘[d]etermination that the Canadian provinces are
providing a financial contribution in the form of the provision of
a good by providing standing timber to timber harvesters through the
stumpage programmes’’ is not inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of
the SCM Agreement.
(x 76, italics in original)
We will discuss the AB’s findings in regard to the calculation of benefit
in Section 2 of this note, and address the pass-through issue in Section 3.
Section 4 states our conclusion.
2 The AB’s findings on alternative benchmarks
In establishing the magnitude of the benefit allegedly provided by the
stumpage programs, the United States employed prices on stumpage
contracts in various US states. The United States justified the procedure
by arguing that, although the use of Canadian private stumpage prices
would have been the preferred option to calculate the amount of benefit,
in this particular case it was not possible to use such prices as the
benchmark, since they were distorted and suppressed by the very
measure under investigation. According to the United States, the trade-
distorting potential of the government’s provision of a good can be
identified only by reference to an independent market price, i.e. a price
that is unaffected by the very trade distortion the test is designed
to identify.
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The Panel explicitly accepted that the United States might have
a point, as a matter of economic logic. It would therefore be desirable
to use other private-sector prices than those prevailing in the
allegedly subsidizing country, in certain special situations. But the
SCM does not allow for this possibility in situations other than those
in which no market price exists in the investigated country. In cases
where market prices exist, WTO Members have to rely on them,
even if the market at hand is small. The Panel felt that, economically
irrational as this outcome may be, it did not have the mandate to
modify the unambiguous terms of the Agreement:
. . . we do not believe that it would be appropriate for this Panel to
substitute its economic judgement for that of the drafters. The Appellate
Body has repeatedly emphasized, and we cannot but agree, that under
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties the inter-
pretation of a treaty must be based on the text, as a proper interpretation
is first of all a textual interpretation. For all the reasons set forth above,
we do not consider that Article 14(d) can, consistent with customary rules
of interpretation of public international law, be understood in the manner
urged by the United States. We consider that our task is to interpret
the applicable provisions as they exist and apply the text of the Agreement
to the facts before us, not to rule on the economic logic of the text as
it stands.
(x 7.59, footnote omitted)
2.1 The US appeal
The Panel’s finding was appealed by the United States. In the AB’s
words, the US claim was the following:
The United States argues that the Panel’s interpretation of Article 14(d)
is ‘‘completely at odds’’ with the concept of ‘‘benefit’’, as used in Article
1.1 of the SCM Agreement and as interpreted by the Appellate Body.
The United States refers to the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the term
‘‘benefit’’ in Article 1.1(b) in Canada  Aircraft, where it said that
a government financial contribution confers a benefit if the ‘‘‘financial
contribution’ makes the recipient ‘better off’ than it would otherwise have
been, absent that contribution’’, and that the marketplace provides the
appropriate basis for comparison. According to the United States, the
Panel’s interpretation would not permit an investigating authority to
determine whether the recipient is better off than it would have been
absent the financial contribution. In addition, the United States contends
united states  softwood lumber from canada 133
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474560600142X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 19:36:51, subject to the Cambridge Core
that the term ‘‘market conditions’’ in Article 14(d) ‘‘can only mean
a market undistorted by the government’s financial contribution.’’
Therefore, the United States submits that USDOC could rightfully
reject the prices of private transactions in Canada as a benchmark.
(x 80, italics in the original)
Consequently, the United States requested the AB to reverse the Panel’s
findings in this respect. The AB understood its task in the following
terms:
The initial issue before us is whether an investigating authority may use
a benchmark, under Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement, other than
private prices in the country of provision for determining if goods have
been provided by a government for less than adequate remuneration.
If our answer were to be in the affirmative, two additional questions
would arise: (i) what are the specific circumstances under Article 14(d)
in which an investigating authority may use a benchmark other than
private prices in the country of provision; and (ii) assuming such
circumstances exist, what alternative benchmarks may an investigating
authority use to determine whether goods were provided by a government
for less than adequate remuneration.
(x 82, footnote omitted)
2.2 The AB’s findings
The AB partitions the claim by the United States into several distinct
issues.
2.2.1 Can alternative benchmarks be used?
The first question addressed is whether Art. 14(d) of the SCM permits
investigating authorities to use a benchmark other than private prices in
the country of provision. The AB here first examines the text, and finds
that the Panel made an erroneous interpretation of the phrase
‘‘in relation to’’ in Art. 14(d) SCM:
. . . The Panel reasoned that the phrase ‘‘in relation to’’ in the context of
Article 14(d) means ‘‘in comparison with’’. . .. As we see it, the phrase ‘‘in
relation to’’ implies a comparative exercise, but its meaning is not limited
to ‘‘in comparison with’’. The phrase ‘‘in relation to’’ has a meaning
similar to the phrases ‘‘as regards’’ and ‘‘with respect to’’. These phrases
do not denote the rigid comparison suggested by the Panel, but may
imply a broader sense of ‘‘relation, connection, reference’’. Thus, the use
of the phrase ‘‘in relation to’’ in Article 14(d) suggests that, contrary to
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the Panel’s understanding, the drafters did not intend to exclude any
possibility of using as a benchmark something other than private prices
in the market of the country of provision.
(xx 8889)
The AB then moves to the context of Art. 14(d) SCM:
The chapeau of Article 14 requires that ‘‘any’’ method used by
investigating authorities to calculate the benefit to the recipient shall be
provided for in a WTO Member’s legislation or regulations, and it
requires that its application be transparent and adequately explained.
The reference to ‘‘any’’ method in the chapeau clearly implies that more
than one method consistent with Article 14 is available to investigating
authorities for purposes of calculating the benefit to the recipient. The
Panel’s interpretation of paragraph (d) that, whenever available, private
prices have to be used exclusively as the benchmark, is not supported
by the text of the chapeau . . .
(x 91)
In addition, a wider interpretation of the concept ‘‘in relation to’’ is
mandated also due to the object and purpose of Art. 14 SCM. The AB
here relies on the argument that government subsidies may distort
private-sector prices, if the private sector is sufficiently small relative
to the government sector:
. . . the determination of the existence of a benefit is a necessary condition
for the application of countervailing measures under the SCM. If the
calculation of the benefit yields a result that is artificially low, or even
zero, as could be the case under the Panel’s approach, then a WTO
Member could not fully offset, by applying countervailing duties, the
effect of the subsidy as permitted by the Agreement.
(x 95)
On the basis of these findings, the AB concludes that the Panel’s inter-
pretation of Art. 14(d) is overly restrictive. Other prices than those
in the country of provision can be used as benchmarks even when the
latter prices exist.
2.2.2 When can alternative benchmarks be used?
The second issue decided by the AB is: when may an investigating
authority use a benchmark other than private prices in the country of
provision? The United States argued in its appeal that this possibility
is not restricted to situations where no privately determined domestic
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price exists at all, but also applies to situations where such prices exist,
but are distorted by the subsidy. The AB here argues that:
. . . there may be little difference between situations where the government
is the sole provider of certain goods and situations where the government
has a predominant role in the market as a provider of those goods.
Whenever the government is the predominant provider of certain goods,
even if not the sole provider, it is likely that it can affect through its
own pricing strategy the prices of private providers for those goods,
inducing the latter to align their prices to the point where there may be
little difference, if any, between the government price and the private
prices. This would be so even if the government price does not represent
adequate remuneration. The resulting comparison of prices carried out
under the Panel’s approach to interpreting Article 14(d) would indicate
a ‘‘benefit’’ that is artificially low, or even zero, such that the full extent
of the subsidy would not be captured, as the Panel itself acknowledged.
As a result, the subsidy disciplines in the SCM Agreement and the right
of Members to countervail subsidies could be undermined or circum-
vented when the government is a predominant provider of certain goods.
(x 100)
It appears to us that the language found in Article 14(d) ensures that
the provision’s purposes are not frustrated in such situations. Thus,
while requiring investigating authorities to calculate benefit ‘‘in relation
to’’ prevailing conditions in the market of the country of provision,
Article 14(d) permits investigating authorities to use a benchmark other
than private prices in that market. When private prices are distorted
because the government’s participation in the market as a provider of the
same or similar goods is so predominant that private suppliers will align
their prices with those of the government-provided goods, it will not be
possible to calculate benefit having regard exclusively to such prices.
(x 101)
But the AB also cautions that the possibility of using alternative
benchmarks is very limited:
. . . We agree with the United States that ‘‘[t]he fact that the government is
a significant supplier of goods does not, in itself, establish that all prices
for the goods are distorted’’. Thus, an allegation that a government is
a significant supplier would not, on its own, prove distortion and allow an
investigating authority to choose a benchmark other than private prices
in the country of provision. The determination of whether private prices
are distorted because of the government’s predominant role in the
market, as a provider of certain goods, must be made on a case-by-case
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basis, according to the particular facts underlying each countervailing
duty investigation.
(x 102)
On the basis of this reflected reasoning, the AB concludes that:
. . . an investigating authority may use a benchmark other than private
prices of the goods in question in the country of provision, when it has
been established that those private prices are distorted, because of the
predominant role of the government in the market as a provider of the
same or similar goods.
x (x 103, underlining added)
The AB thus reverses the Panel’s finding and determines that prices
other than private-sector prices in the country of provision may be used:
. . . when it has been established that those private prices are distorted
because of the predominant role of the government in the market as
a provider of the same or similar products . . .
(x 103)
2.2.3 Which alternative benchmarks can be used?
The AB reports that at the oral hearing, Canada suggested three
possibilities:
. . . (i) a benchmark constructed using a methodology similar to that
provided in Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the ‘‘Anti-Dumping
Agreement ’’); (ii) a proxy estimated on the basis of costs of production;
and (iii) a methodology that examines whether government prices are
consistent with market principles . . .
(x 105)
The United States instead proposed world market prices available in
the country of provision, or an examination of the consistency of the
contested measures with market principles. The AB agreed to these
proposals in very general terms. But it refrained from taking any more
definite stands, since the issue before it was limited to whether the
method actually employed by the US authority was legal.
2.2.4 The legality of the method employed by the United States
The Panel’s finding that the method employed by the United States 
to use prices from neighboring US states as benchmarks  was illegal
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under Art. 14(d) SCM, was based on an interpretation of this Article
that the AB had hitherto rejected. The AB therefore reversed the Panel’s
finding. Having reversed this finding, the AB would have been required
to determine the legality of the US method de novo. But it refrained
from doing this, since, in its view, it lacked the necessary factual
information that would have allowed it to complete such a legal analysis.
2.3 Discussion
As a matter of economic logic, we fully agree with the AB that alternative
benchmarks are necessary in cases where the government significantly
influences private prices, directly or indirectly. As emphasized by the
AB, when undertaking such calculations, it will be necessary to adjust
the benchmark prices, in order to appropriately account for various
differences between different markets, such as differences in produc-
tion costs, transport costs, costs of capital, or differences in taxation
that may directly or indirectly affect any price comparison, etc.
But while as a matter of principle it is necessary to use alternative
benchmarks, it will in practice most likely be very hard to determine
these in a satisfactory fashion. As we discussed in Horn and
Mavroidis (2005), there are fundamental difficulties with the SCM
in this respect.
While we are sympathetic to the AB’s findings from this perspective,
although concerned about its practical aspects, we see a legal problem
with the AB’s textual analysis. The AB seems to be drawing very far-
reaching conclusions from the distinction it draws between the Panel’s
interpretation of ‘‘in relation to’’ as meaning ‘‘in comparison with,’’ and
their own, wider interpretation of ‘‘relation, connection, reference.’’
From this wider interpretation, the AB infers that:
. . . the drafters did not intend to exclude any possibility of using as
a benchmark something other than private prices in the market of
provision.
(x 89)
We fail to see that such an interpretation of the drafters’ intentions
could be read from the three words ‘‘relation, connection, reference.’’
If the drafters intended the term ‘‘in relation to’’ to be of such an
indicative nature, why were they not more explicit on this score, by
including a term such as ‘‘inter alia’’? If silence means something
(as the AB has time and again told us), then clearly in this case it must
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mean that the founding fathers had no wish to provide alternative
benchmarks.
We are thus led to conclude that the Panel’s interpretation is more
correct than that of the AB, from a textual point of view. This is what
prompted us, in our report of last year, to recommend a formal
amendment of the SCM in this respect. As we see it, the AB’s finding
is effectively impermissible judicial activism, since the AB’s interpretation
of Art. 14(d) SCM amounts to a formal amendment of the provision.
As Art. X of the Agreement Establishing the WTO makes plain, this is
the exclusive privilege of the Herren der Vertra¨ge, the WTOMembership.
We believe that even an authentic interpretation (as per Art. IX of
the Agreement Establishing the WTO) is legally impossible here, since,
what is requested is not a specification of a term, but, instead, a complete
turnaround of the situation (by providing for the possibility, nonexisting
in the current text, to use alternative benchmarks every time a situation
similar to that of the instant case is present).
3 When is a pass-through analysis necessary?
The third substantive issue that the AB addresses concerns the need
for analysis of the pass-through of any subsidy to log production, to
downstream lumber production. Canada claimed before the Panel that
in instances where the recipient of the (alleged) subsidy is at arm’s
length from the subject of the countervailing duty  the lumber
producer  the United States was required to conduct a pass-through
analysis. The United States, on the other hand, claimed that there was
no such necessity when the subsidy determination was made on an
aggregate basis.
In the view of the Panel,
[t]he heart of the pass-through issue is whether, where a subsidy is
received by someone other than the producer or exporter of the product
under investigation, the subsidy nevertheless can be said to have conferred
benefits in respect of that product . . .
(x 7.91 Panel report)
The Panel concluded that this cannot be taken for granted. With regard
to the US argument that the analysis was performed on an aggregate
basis, the Panel responded:
Thus, contrary to the US argument, the question of pass-through has
to do with correctly identifying the subsidy amount attributable to the
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subject merchandise entering the US (the numerator). The fact that the
US conducted the lumber investigation on an aggregate basis does not
prevent and cannot cure the overall numerator (the aggregate subsidy
amount from the stumpage programmes) from being overstated where
upstream transactions for inputs between unrelated entities are present
and subsidies have not been passed through.
(x 7.98)
The Panel consequently found in favor of Canada.
3.1 The US appeal
The United States appealed the Panel’s determination, claiming that no
pass-through analysis of subsidization to log production for the pro-
duction of softwood lumber was necessary in two specific situations
involving arm’s-length relationships:
(1) where a tenured timber harvester owns a sawmill and processes
some of the logs it harvests into softwood lumber, but at the same
time sells, at arm’s length, some of the logs it harvests to unrelated
sawmills for processing into lumber; and
(2) where a tenured timber harvester processes logs it harvests into
lumber and sells, at arm’s length, some or all of this lumber to
lumber re-manufacturers for further processing.
3.2 The AB’s findings
The AB first points out that, according to the text General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and the SCM, as well as according
to case law,
. . . where countervailing duties are used to offset subsidies granted to
producers of input products, while the duties are to be imposed on
processed products, and where input producers and downstream
processors operate at arm’s length, the investigating authority must
establish that the benefit conferred by a financial contribution directly on
input producers is passed through, at least in part, to producers of the
processed product subject to the investigation.
(x 146, italics in original)
The AB also dismisses the argument by the United States that:
. . . no pass-through analysis was required with respect to arm’s length
sales of logs and lumber by tenured timber harvesters owning sawmills,
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to unrelated sawmills and re-manufacturers, because Article 19.3
recognizes that exporters who are not investigated individually may
nevertheless be subject to countervailing duties; accordingly, it is not
necessary, in an aggregate investigation, to determine whether individual
producers or exporters actually received subsidies.
(x 148)
. . .[w]here the producer of the input is not the same entity as the
producer of the processed product, it cannot be presumed, however, that
the subsidy bestowed on the input passes through to the processed
product. In such case, it is necessary to analyze to what extent subsidies on
inputs may be included in the determination of the total amount
of subsidies bestowed upon processed products. For it is only the sub-
sidies determined to have been granted upon the processed products that
may be offset by levying countervailing duties on those products.
(x 140)
The AB agrees with the United States that Members are allowed to
perform an investigation on an aggregate basis. But it nevertheless
rejects the US claim that a pass-through analysis is for this reason not
required:
. . . country-wide or company-specific countervailing duty rates may be
imposed under Part V of the SCM Agreement only after the investigating
authority has determined the existence of subsidization, injury to the
domestic industry, and a causal link between them . . .
(x 154, italics in original)
3.2.1 Sales of logs at arm’s length by timber harvesters/sawmills
to independent lumber producers
We now turn to the first of the two situations that the United States
wanted the AB to examine: where logs are sold by vertically integrated
harvesters/primary lumber producers to independent primary lumber
producers. The United States claimed that in such a case there was
no need for a pass-through analysis, because the harvester/sawmill was
a producer of the product subject to the investigation by processing
some logs into softwood lumber in its own sawmill.
The AB understands the United States to be arguing that the arm’s-
length sales may be cross-subsidizing the harvester/lumber producer’s
own primary lumber production:
. . . We understand the United States to argue that benefits, initially
attached to logs, but retained by a harvester/sawmill when the logs are
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sold in arm’s length transactions to unrelated buyers, may be used by such
a vendor to ‘‘cross-subsidize’’ its own production of softwood lumber
processed in-house from other logs . . .
(x 157)
But the AB does not accept this argument as a reason for not performing
a pass-through analysis:
. . . We agree, in the abstract, that a transfer of benefits from logs sold in
arm’s length transactions to lumber produced in-house from different
logs is possible for a harvester that owns a sawmill. But whether, in fact,
this occurs depends on the particular case under examination. In any
event, these arm’s length sales at issue concern logs, which are not
products subject to the investigation. Accordingly, in cases where
logs are sold by a harvester/sawmill in arm’s length transactions to
unrelated sawmills, it may not be assumed that benefits attaching
to the logs (non-subject products) automatically pass through to the
lumber (the subject product) produced by the harvester/sawmill. A pass-
through analysis is thus required in such situations.
(x 157, italics in original)
Indeed, we disagree with the proposition that, as long as an enterprise
produces products subject to an investigation, any benefits accruing to the
same enterprise from subsidies conferred on any different products it
produces (which are not subject to that investigation), could be included,
without need of a pass-through analysis, in the total amount of
subsidization found to exist for the investigated product, and that may
be offset by levying countervailing duties on that product. We conclude
that the pass-through of the benefit cannot be presumed with respect to
arm’s length sales of logs by harvesters, who own sawmills, to unrelated
sawmills, for further processing.
(x 158, italics in original)
The AB thus upheld the Panel’s finding that the lack of pass-
through analysis violated US obligations under Arts. 10 and 32.1 SCM,
and Art. VI:3 of the GATT 1994.
3.2.2 Sales of lumber at arm’s length by timber harvesters/sawmills
to independent lumber re-manufacturers
The final issue addressed by the AB is the US claim that no pass-through
analysis is needed in a case where a tenured timber harvester processes
logs it harvests into lumber and sells, at arm’s length, some or all of the
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lumber to re-manufacturers for further processing. The AB starts by
emphasizing that in such a case:
. . . the products of both the harvesters/sawmills and the re-manufacturers
are subject to the investigation . . .
(x 161, italics in original)
The AB then quotes from the Panel report:
. . . some portion of any subsidy from stumpage is attributable to the
harvester/sawmill’s production of the lumber for re-manufacturing
and some is attributable to the other products (including lumber) that
the harvester/sawmill produces. Here, if the subsidies attributable to
the lumber for re-manufacturing are not passed through to the
re-manufacturer that purchases it, then those subsidies should not be
included in the numerator of the subsidization equation, as in this
situation it is the re-manufactured product, not the upstream lumber
product, that is the subject merchandise under investigation.
(x 162)
The AB dismisses this reasoning as a confusing of pass-through
questions that may arise when individual enterprises are investigated
with questions arising when calculations are made on an aggregate
basis:
. . . Once it has been established that benefits from subsidies received
by producers of non-subject products (that is, inputs) have passed
through to producers of subject products (primary and remanufactured
softwood lumber), we do not see why a further pass-through analysis
between producers of subject products should be required in an
investigation conducted on an aggregate basis. In this situation, it is
not necessary to calculate precisely how subsidy benefits are divided up
between the producers of subject products in order to calculate, on an
aggregate basis, the total amount of subsidy and the country-wide
countervailing duty rate for those subject products.
(x 163, italics in original)
The AB notes that this procedure may result in the imposition
of duties on shipments of re-manufactured softwood that is not being
subsidized. But this is nevertheless ‘‘by the book’’:
. . . Article 19 of the SCM Agreement contemplates the imposition of
a country-wide countervailing duty rate, even when a specific exporter
is not subsidized, or when that country-wide rate does not match the
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precise amount of subsidization benefiting a specific shipment . . . [T]he
possibility for an exporter not investigated individually to request,
pursuant to Article 19.3, an expedited review to establish an individual
countervailing duty rate for that exporter, also confirms that a country-
wide duty rate may, in principle, be imposed. However, the pass-through
question would not be the same when determining, through the review
procedure provided for in Article 19.3, an individual countervailing duty
rate for the exporter that requested the review. In such a review, it is likely
that a pass-through analysis would be required to determine whether
input subsidies on logs, having passed through to the production of
softwood lumber inputs, have passed through also to remanufactured
lumber produced from those inputs by the particular exporter.
(x 164, italics in original, footnote omitted)
The AB thus reversed the Panel’s finding that the failure to conduct
a pass-through analysis in respect of arm’s-length sales of lumber
by tenured harvesters/sawmills to unrelated re-manufacturers violates
Arts. 10 and 32.1 SCM and Art. VI:3 GATT 1994.
3.3 Discussion
From an economic perspective, whether a pass-through analysis
should be undertaken or not clearly depends on what the purpose of
such an analysis would be, which in turn must reflect the purpose of
the SCM and Art. VI GATT. But if the purpose is to prevent
injury to import-competing industry, and the countervailing duty
(CVD) should only just offset such injury, then it is always necessary
to perform a pass-though analysis, regardless of the vertical structure
of the industry in the allegedly subsidizing country. This is, of course,
the purpose of CVDs. Contrary to what seems to be the prevailing
view among the parties to this dispute, and also the adjudicating
bodies, there is no guarantee that in the case of a vertically integrated
structure, subsidies to upstream activities will affect downstream pro-
duction (even though there is probably a presumption to this effect).
And in the case of arm’s-length relationships, it is entirely possible,
if not likely, that there will be effects on downstream production
from upstream subsidization.
The AB seems to agree with this view, since, if it thought that
a pass-through analysis was unnecessary, presumably it would have
said so, and suggested what should take place instead. But it did not.
The reason it reversed the Panel’s findings with respect to sales of
lumber at arm’s length by timber harvesters/sawmills to independent
144 henrik horn and petros c. mavroidis
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474560600142X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 19:36:51, subject to the Cambridge Core
lumber re-manufactures is that in such cases, because duties can be
imposed on an aggregate basis, there is a legislative presumption that
exported softwood lumber from noninvestigated Canadian producers
has been subsidized (Art. 19.3 SCM), and therefore there is no need
for an additional investigation to the same effect. One may indeed
question the reasonableness of this provision. But such a task was
not before the AB, and for this reason we leave this issue aside. What
can be noted, however, is that an aggregate procedure must by
necessity be imprecise, and lead to duties on individual products that
do not reflect the actual extent of subsidization. But it is hard to say
anything about how such a calculation should be performed from an
economic point of view. Also, economic operators who have not been
subsidized can always request refund of duties, assuming they have
proven that they never benefited from a subsidy. There is, by virtue of
Art. 19.3 SCM, a reversal of the burden of proof, in the sense that, CVDs
can be imposed without a prior demonstration of subsidization.
4 Concluding remarks
The Panel and the AB seem in this dispute to have moved in the
direction of generally both desiring and requiring a pass-through
analysis, in contrast to the Panel’s position in Softwood Lumber III.
As we have explained, we find such a move intellectually appealing.
We also find the AB’s approach refreshing in being less narrowly
textual, and placing greater emphasis on context and purpose, even
though, regrettably, this time the AB went too far in this direction.
We find it hard to interpret Art. 14(d) SCM, as it now stands, so as to
allow for alternative benchmarks of the type proposed by the United
States to be used. While the Panel acknowledged this restriction
imposed by the Agreement, the AB neglected it, and by taking on
the role of the legislator, the AB thus contravened Art. 3.2 DSU.
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